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I. THE MOVEMENT OF BOTH THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE AND
THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE TOWARD A
PHYSICALITY REQUIREMENT FOR SOFrWARE-RELATED INVENTIONS
The increasing influence of computers on the modem world has led to a
growing number of innovations in the area of computers, including software. As
a result, applications for software-related patents have increased over the past few
decades.' This surge of software-related patent applications has forced the
European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) to address whether inventions related to software are patentable
subject matter. Each entity has adapted to the increasing acceptance of software-
related patents over time, as is exemplified by the case law before the Boards of
Appeal of the European Patent Office (Board) and U.S. courts. Furthermore, in
light of recent case law, a common thread exists in the current approaches in
Europe and the United States: The presence of a physical hardware element in
the claimed software-related invention will usually be sufficient to fulfill the
patentable subject matter requirement before both the Board and U.S. courts.
Thus, although differences still exist between the two approaches, case law in
Europe and in the United States has effectively converged upon a physicality
requirement.
This Article surveys the approaches to determining the patentability of
software-related inventions taken under the European Patent Convention and in
the United States. Regarding the European approach, recent cases before the
Board will be surveyed and common themes, including the physicality
requirement, will be identified. Regarding the American approach, the evolution
of case law regarding 35 U.S.C. § 101 will be traced by analyzing important cases
over the last three decades, which have seen rapid changes in the area of software-
related inventions. The USPTO's interpretation of these cases will also be
discussed in relation to the USPTO's Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related
Inventions. Finally, the European and American approaches will then be compared
and contrasted, revealing a general convergence of both jurisdictions on a
physicality requirement for the patentability of software-related inventions.
See David S. Evans& BernardJ. Reddy, Government PreferencesforPromoting Open-S ource Soware:
A Solution in Search ofa Prob/em, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. &TECH. L. REv. 313,321 (2003) ("The number
of software patents awarded annually to U.S. inventors has increased from 829 in 1986 to 7398 in
2000.").
2008]
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A. ALTHOUGH THE EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION EXCLUDES "COMPUTER
PROGRAMS" AS NON-PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, RECENT CASES INDICATE
THAT SOFTWARE-RELATED CLAIMS MAY BE PATENTED SO LONG AS THEY
CONTAIN PHYSICAL HARDWARE FEATURES
From a superficial level, one might easily get the impression that software-
related patents, and software in particular, are barred from patentability under the
European Patent Convention (EPC). After all, Article 52 of the EPC, which
governs patentability, provides as follows:
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which
involve an inventive step.
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions
within the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers,
(d) presentations of information.
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the
subject-matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the
extent to which a European patent application or European patent
relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.2
However, despite this somewhat conclusory prohibition against the
patentability of "programs for computers,"3 recent decisions by the Board have
accepted the patentability of software-related inventions.
1. The Patentabiliy of Software-Related Inventions under EPC Article 52. Before
surveying the individual decisions by the Board that indicate acceptance of
software-related inventions, a general overview of decisions from the Board
regarding the patentability of software-related inventions under Article 52 is in
order. Generally, under Article 52, claimed subject matter must fulfill four
requirements to be entitled to a patent.4 Specifically, the claimed subject matter
2 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) art. 52,
Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 271-72 [hereinafter EPC] (emphasis added).
3Id.
' Estimating sales activity/DUNS LICENSING ASSOCIATES (Duns Licensing), Decision
T 0154/04-3.5.01, 17-18 (Tech. Bd. App. Nov. 15, 2006), avai/abk at http://egal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/pdf/t040154exl.pdf; Auction method/HITACHI (Aution Metbod), Decision
T 0258/03, 12/2004 O.J. E.P.O. 575, 580 (Tech. Bd. App. 2004), available at http://www.european-
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must be an "invention," and the invention must be new, inventive, and
industrially applicable.' The patentability of claimed subject matters turns on
whether the claimed subject matter is an "invention," as defined by Article 52.6
An "invention" is subject matter having technical character.7
Paragraph (2) of Article 52 is a negative, non-exhaustive list of what should
not be regarded as an invention within the meaning of Article 52(l).8 Paragraph
(3) of Article 52 was introduced as a bar to a broad interpretation of Article
52(2).' Thus, the list of excluded subjects in Article 52(2) should not be given too
broad a scope of application."0 In addition, although Article 52(2) excludes
"programs for computers" as such, the claim category of a computer-
implemented method is distinguished from a computer program; thus, a
computer-implemented method is not excluded, as such, from patentability under
Article 52(2)."
The determination as to whether claimed subject matter is an invention is a
prerequisite to examination of the claimed subject matter with respect to novelty,
inventive step, and industrial application. 2 Furthermore, the determination as to
whether claimed subject matter is an invention, including whether the claimed
subject matter is excluded under Article 52(2), is made without considering the
prior art, and uses a broad interpretation of the term "invention."'3 A claim that
includes both technical and non-technical features may be an invention and,
therefore, may be patentable under Article 52."4 The aforementioned rules have
been applied in the cases of the Board described below in Part I.A.2.
patent-office.org/epo/pubs/oj004/12_04/12_5754.pdf.
Duns Li~censing, supra note 4, at 17-18; Auction Method, supra note 4, at 580.
SeeAucdon Method, supra note 4, at 580-81 (explaining that verification that the claimed subject
matter is an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) is a prerequisite for the examination of
the other three patentability criteria).
Id.; Duns Licensing, supra note 4, at 18, 23-25.
Duns iUcensing supra note 4, at 20.
Id. at 20-21.
10 Id.
" See Clipboard Formats I/MICROSOFT (Microsoft), Decision T 0424/03-3.5.01, 9-10 (Tech.
Bd. App. Feb. 23,2006), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/tO30424eul.
pdf (stating that a computer-implemented method is distinct from a computer program and that a
computer-implemented method is considered an invention under Article 52(1) of the EPC).
12 Auction Method, supra note 4, at 580-81.
13 Id. at 580-82, 585; Duns Licensing, supra note 4, at 18.
14 Duns icensing, supra note 4, at 18, 32; Auction Method, supra note 4, at 582-83 (citing General
purpose management system/SOHEI, DecisionT0769/92-3.5.1,8/1995 O.J. E.P.O. 525, headnote
II (Tech. Bd. App. 1994), available athttp://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t920769ex1.
pdf ("Non-exclusion from patentability cannot be destroyed by an additional feature which as such
would itself be excluded .. .
20081
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2. Board Decisions Addressing the Patentability of Software-Related Inventions.
a. The Auction Method Case. In the seminal case Auction Method, which
has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, the Board considered whether an
automated auction that was executable on a computer was patentable subject
matter under Article 52.5 The automated auction in Auction Metbod was claimed
as an apparatus, method, and computer program. 6 Because the claimed apparatus
and computer program carried out the steps in the method claim, the Board
considered the method claim to be representative of the apparatus and computer
program claims.'
7
The Board first addressed the patentability of the apparatus claim under
Article 52. The apparatus claim claimed a "computerised auction apparatus for
s Auction Method, supra note 4.
IS Id. at 576-78.
17 See id at 576-77. The Board quoted the method claim of the main request as follows:
1. An automatic auction method executed in a server computer comprising the
steps of:
a) transmitting information on a product to be auctioned to a plurality of
client computers via a network, each client computer belonging to a bidder;
b) receiving a plurality of auction ordering information pieces, each including
a desired price and a maximum price in competitive state, for purchase of said
product, from the plurality of client computers via the network,
c) storing the received auction ordering information pieces in the server
computer for respective bidders;
d) setting an auction price;
e) determining whether there is any bidder who proposes a desired price equal
to or higher than the auction price using the auction ordering information pieces
stored in the server computer;
f if there is no bidder in the step e), lowering the auction price, and repeating
the step e);
g) if there is more than one bidder at step e), judging whether there is more
than one bidder for whom the auction price is less than or equal to the desired
price such that a competitive state occurs using the auction ordering information
pieces stored in the server computer;
h) if the competitive state occurs, increasing the auction price by a
predetermined value;
i) excluding the bidder who proposes acceptable a price lower than the
increased auction price and specifying the other bidder or bidders using the
auction ordering information;
j) judging whether the competitive state occurs among the bidder or bidders
specified in the step i);
k) repeating the steps h), i) and j) and determining the remaining bidder as a
successful bidder when there is no competitive state at step j; and
1) if no competitive state occurs in the step g), determining the remaining
bidder as a successful bidder.
[Vol. 15:239
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performing an automatic auction via a network, among a plurality of bidders, the
bidders using a corresponding plurality of client computers," with the apparatus
comprising the means for performing the steps claimed in the method claim.'"
Citing Controllingpension benefits system/PBS PARTNERSHIP, the Board observed
that "[a]n apparatus constituting a physical entity or concrete product, suitable for
performing or supporting an economic activity is an invention within the meaning
of Article 52(1) EPC."'19 In conformity with this observation, the Board ruled that
the apparatus claim was "an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC
since it comprises clearly technical features such as a 'server computer,' 'client
computers,' and a 'network.' "20 Hence, the Board identified physical devices
having a technical nature to form a conclusion that the apparatus claim
constituted patentable subject matter under Article 52.
The Board next addressed the patentability of the method claim, which
claimed, "[a]n automatic auction method executed in a server computer.",2 ' The
Board began by observing that the reasoning expounded for the apparatus claim
also applied to the method claim even though a method is a different claim
category.' The Board also found that the relevant inquiry in determining whether
the method claim was an invention was "the presence of technical character
which may be implied by the physical features of an entity or the nature of an
activity, or may be conferred to a non-technical activity by the use of technical
means."23  Thus, activities or methods excluded from patentability as non-
inventions, as such, "would typically represent purely abstract concepts devoid of
any technical implications., 24 The Board held that the claimed method was an
invention and therefore patentable subject matter under Article 52.25
The Board also rejected any approach to determining patentability that would
conflate the patentability inquiry with an inventive step inquiry. To avoid such
conflation, the Board concluded that "[t]he structure of the EPC therefore
suggests that it should be possible to determine whether subject-matter is
excluded under Article 52(2) EPC without any knowledge of the state of the art
(including common general knowledge). 2 6 Toward this end, the Board rejected
1 Id. at 577.'
I9 Id. at 583 (citing Controing pension benefits system/PBS PARTNERSHIP, Decision
T 0931/95-3.5.1, 10/2001 O.J. E.P.O. 441, headnote III (Tech. Bd. App. 2000), availabkathttp://
www.european-patent-office.org/epo/pubs/ojOO1 /10 01 /10441 1.pdf).
20 Id.
21 Id at 577.
22 Id. at 584.
23 Id. at 585.
24 Id
23 Id.
26 Id. at 580-81.
2008]
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the "contribution approach" to determining the patentability of claimed subject
matter.2' The "contribution approach" is an approach that assesses the
patentability of claimed subject matter based on the contribution that is made in
a field not excluded from patentability.'
Significantly, the Board also recognized that "its comparatively broad
interpretation of the term 'invention' in Article 52(1) EPC will include activities
which are so familiar that their technical character tends to be overlooked, such
as the act of writing using pen and paper. ' 29 This statement revealed the Board's
intention that the "invention" threshold for claimed subject matter be a low
threshold. Nonetheless, inventions under Article 52, the Board continued, must
still "be new, represent a non-obvious technical solution to a technical problem,
and be susceptible of industrial application" in order to be entitled to a patent.30
Finally, the Board addressed whether computer program claim 4 was
patentable subject matter under Article 52. 3' Computer program claim 4 claimed
a " 'computer program which, when run on a computer network comprising
client computers and a server,' carries out the method of claim 1. 32 However,
the Board declined to examine whether computer program claim 4 was an
invention under Article 52 because of computer program claim 4's failure to
involve an inventive step.33 In conclusion, the Board in Auction Method set a low
threshold for the patentability of software-related inventions and declined to
consider any prior art in making a determination as to whether software-related
claimed subject matter constituted an invention under Article 52.
b. The Duns Licensing Case. The Board's approach in Auction Methodwas
affirmed in Duns Licensing, which involved a software-related invention used for
business research purposes. 4 In particular, the Board addressed whether method
claim 1 of the applicant's main request3' and method claim 1 of the applicant's
27 Id. at 584.
' Id. at 581 (citing Text processing/IBM, Decision T 0038/86.3.5.1, headnote III (Tech. Bd.
App. Feb. 14, 1989), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t860038epi.
htm).
2 Id at 585.
30 Id.
31 Id at 589.
32 Id. at 577.
33 Id. at 589.
' See Duns Licensing, supra note 4.
31 Method claim 1 of the main request in Duns Licensing is as follows:
1. A method for estimating sales activity of a product at sales outlets (UI,U2)
comprising
receiving sales data for said product from a plurality of first sales outlets (S -
S5);
providing a database (205) of sales outlets, said database including geographic
[Vol. 15:239
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first auxiliary request36 constituted "inventions," and therefore patentable subject
matter, under Article 52. The claims at issue in Duns Licensing provided a business
method for estimating sales or product distribution at a non-reporting sales outlet
based on sample sales data from reporting sales outlets.37
In making its decision, the Board confirmed the importance that an invention
under Article 52 have a "technical character."38 Because "[t]he enumeration of
typical non-inventions in Article 52(2) EPC covers subjects whose common
feature is a substantial lack of technical character," Article 52(2) may be used as
guide for determining whether claimed subject matter has a "technical
character." 39 The Board also cited, as a valid instrument for construing the EPC,
the Basic Proposalfor the Revision of the European Patent Convention (Basic Prposai),'
data and characterizing data from said first sales outlets (SI -S5) and at least one
other sales outlet (U1,U2);
determining the distance d_ between said other sales outlet (U1,U2) and each
of a selected plurality of said first sales outlets (S1-$5) using said geographic data;
formulating a weighting factor for each of said selected plurality of said first
sales outlets and said other sales outlet, said weighting factor being a function of
said distance and said characterizing data; and
estimating the sales of said other sales outlet (U1,U2) using said sales data for
said selected first sales outlets (S1-$5) and said weighting factors.
Id. at 1-2.
Method claim 1 of the first auxiliary request is as follows:
1. A method for estimating sales activity of a product at sales outlets using a data
processing system (UI,U2) comprising-
receiving sales data for said product from a plurality of first sales outlets (S -
S5);
providing a database (205) of sales outlets, said database including geographic
data and characterizing data from said first sales outlets ($1-$5) and at least one
other sales outlet (U1,U2);
operating a processor to determine the distance d,_ between said other sales
outlet (U1,U2) and each of a selected plurality of said first sales outlets ($1-$5)
using said geographic data;
operating said processor to formulate a weighting factor for each of said
selected plurality of said first sales outlets and said other sales outlet, said
weighting factor being a function of said distance and said characterizing data;
and
operating said processor to estimate the sales of said other sales outlet
(U1,U2) using said sales data for said selected first sales outlets (S1-$5) and said
weighting factors.
Id. at 2-3.
31 Id. at 9-10.
38 Id. at 21-25.
9 Id. at 23.
o Baic Proposalfor the Revision of the Eumpean Patent Convention (Oct. 13, 2000), available at http://
documents.espo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/43F40380331CE97CC125727A0039243C/
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which helps clarify the meaning of "technical character."'" Specifically, the Basic
Proposal states that "[i]n order to be patentable, the subject-matter claimed must
therefore have a 'technical character' or to be more precise - involve a 'technical
teaching,' ie [sic] an instruction addressed to a skilled person as to how to solve
a particular technical problem using particular technical means.
4 2
In addition, the Board took pains to stress the importance of separating the
invention requirement on the one hand and the novelty and inventive step
requirements on the other.4 3 In fact, the Board dedicated eight pages of the
decision to this topic.44 In doing so, the Board also rejected considering prior art
in making a determination as to whether claimed subject matter is an invention
under Article 52. For example, the Board stated that "[t]he presence of technical
character is an invention (as well as for the industrial applicability) is an absolute
requirement that does not imply any new contribution to the prior art. '46
The Board concluded that method claim I of the main request was excluded
from patentability under Article 52 because the claim was a method of business
research analogous to schemes, rules, and methods of doing business. 47 Schemes,
rules, and methods of doing business are explicitly excluded from patentability
under Article 52(2)(c).' Specifically, the Board held that "[c]reating information
about sales activities or other types of business data using mathematical and
statistical methods to evaluate data gathered from the respective business
environment is a business research activity, which like other research methods
does not serve to solve a technical problem relevant to any technical field."'49 The
Board continued:
Interacting with and exploiting information about the physical
word [sic] belongs to the very nature of any business-related
activity. Accepting such features as sufficient for establishing
patentability would render the exclusion of business methods under
Article 52(2)(c) EPC meaningless. Therefore, the Board judges that
gathering and evaluating data as part of a business research method,
even if the data relates to physical parameters or geographic
$File/00002aen.pdf.
" Id. at 23-24.
42 Id. at 24.
43 Id. at 25-27.
'4 Id. at 25-32.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 25.
47 Id at 36-37.
4 See EPC, supra note 4, at 271-72.
4 Duns L'censing, spra note 4, at 36-37.
[Vol. 15:239
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information as in the present case, do not convey technical
character to a business research method if such steps do not
contribute to the technical solution of a technical problem.
Determining sales data and geographical distances between
outlets and using this data to estimate sales at specific outlets by
means of the statistical method claimed and disclosed in the
application do not solve any technical problem in a technical field.
The definitions in claim 1 do not imply the use of any technical
system or means. The term "database", in particular, may be
construed to designate any collection of data so that claim 1
encompasses methods which may be performed without using any
technical means at all.°
Thus, in addition to holding that method claim I of the main request was an
excluded method of doing business, the Board also found that the claimed
"database" did not lend any technical character to the method claim."' In
particular, the Board construed "database" to include "any collection of data," and
therefore not necessarily reliant upon technical means.
5 2
In stark contrast, relying upon Auction Method, the Board held that method
claim 1 of the first auxiliary request was an invention under Article 52.
Specifically, the Board held that "[a]uxiliary request 1 explicitly claims technical
means (processor) to perform individual steps of the method. From the
HITACHI decision T 258/03 (supra), Reasons Nos. 4.1 to 4.7, it follows that the
claimed method is an invention in terms of Article 52(1) EPC. 54 The Board's
reliance on the physical presence of the "processor" in method claim I of the first
auxiliary request to reach the exact opposite conclusion than for method claim 1
of the main request indicates that the Board, in fact, tends to use a mere
physicality requirement for determining whether claimed subject matter is an
invention under Article 52.
c. The Microsoft Case. The Board's holding in Microsoft further
strengthened the veiled physicality requirement in the Board's Article 52
jurisprudence.55 In Microsoft, the Board addressed whether a method claim and a
computer program claim for transferring data in a plurality of clipboard formats
were inventions under Article 52.56
" Id. at 37.
51 Id.
52 Id.
" Id. at 38.
54 Id.
5 See Microsoft, supra note 11.
56 Id.
2008]
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Regarding the computer-implemented method claim, 7 the Board concluded
that the method claim was an invention under Article 52.8 As in Auction Method
and Duns Licensing, the Board in Mieosoft identified a physical feature of the claim
and used the physical feature to form a conclusion that the claim had technical
character and was therefore an invention.5 9 Specifically, the Board identified the
clipboard feature of the claim, which the Board interpreted to be memory.' The
Board, applying the rule in Auction Method, stated, "[a] computer system including
a memory (clipboard) is a technical means, and consequently the claimed method
has technical character in accordance with established case law."'
The Board also addressed the patentability of method claims that are
implemented in a computer system, which the Board referred to as the computer-
implemented method category of claims:
Moreover, the Board would like to emphasise [sic] that a method
implemented in a computer system represents a sequence of steps
actually performed and achieving an effect, and not a sequence of
computer-executable instructions (i.e. a computer program) which
just have the potential of achieving such an effect when loaded into,
and run on, a computer. Thus, the Board holds that the claim
category of a computer-implemented method is distinguished from
that of a computer program. Even though a method, in particular
s7 Method claim I in Mirosoft is as follows:
1. A method in a computer system (10) having a clipboard for performing data
transfer of data in a clipboard format, said method comprising the steps of:
providing several clipboard formats including a text clipboard format, a file
contents clipboard format and a file group descriptor clipboard format,
selecting data that is not a file for a data transfer operation,
using the file contents clipboard format to hold said data by
converting said selected data into converted data of said file contents
clipboard format and storing the converted data as a data object,
using the file group descriptor clipboard format to hold a file descriptor
holding descriptive information about the data that is to be encapsulated into a
file during the data transfer operation,
completing the data transfer by providing a handle to said data object, using
said handle to paste said data of said data object to a data sink,
using said descriptive information to enable the computer system to create a
file at the data sink and
encapsulating the data object into said file.
Id. at 2.
8 Id at 9-11.
s9 Id at 9-10.
60 Id.
6 Id at 9.
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a method of operating a computer, may be put into practice with
the help of a computer program, a claim relating to such a method
does not claim a computer program in the category of a computer
program. Hence, present claim 1 cannot relate to a computer
program as such.62
Thus, the Board held that a computer-implemented method is distinguishable
from a computer program product and therefore is not excluded by paragraph (2)
of Article 52. Accordingly, the Board held that the method claim at issue in
Microsoft, which was implemented in a computer system, was not a computer
program as such and therefore was not excluded from being an invention under
Article 52.63
Regarding the computer program claim in Microsoft, the Board concluded that
it also constituted an invention under Article 52.' The computer program claim
claimed "a computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions
adapted to cause the computer system to perform the method of" claim 1.65
Once again, the Board reached the conclusion that the computer program was an
invention by identifying a physical feature from the computer program claim and
using the physical feature as evidence of a "technical character" of the claim.66
The Board, citing Auction Method, specifically identified the "computer-readable
medium" feature of the claim as evidencing a "technical character" of the claim.
The Board explained as follows:
Claim 5 is directed to a computer-readable medium having
computer-executable instructions (i.e. a computer program) on it to
cause the computer system to perform the claimed method. The
subject-matter of claim 5 has technical character since it relates to
a computer-readable medium, i.e. a technical product involving a
carrier. Moreover, the computer-executable instructions have the
potential of achieving the above-mentioned further technical effect
of enhancing the internal operation of the computer, which goes
beyond the elementary interaction of any hardware and software of
data processing. The computer program recorded on the medium
is therefore not considered to be a computer program as such, and
62 Id at 10.
63 id.
6 Id. at 10-11.
66 See id at 2.
SId at 11.
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thus also contributes to the technical character of the claimed
subject-matter.67
In addition to identifying the physical feature of a computer-readable medium
from the computer program claim to support a holding of patentability, the Board
also noted that the computer-executable instructions "have the potential of
achieving the above-mentioned further technical effect of enhancing the internal
operation of the computer, which goes beyond the elementary interaction of any
hardware and software of data processing."" Thus, the Board placed weight on
the effect of the computer program on the internal operation of the computer.
The Board, however, did not clarify the relative weight given to the presence of
a physical feature on the one hand and the technical effect of the computer
program claim on the other hand.
d. The Konami Case. In Video game/Konami Co. (Konami), the Board again
used the presence of a physical feature to determine patentability under Article 52.69
Specifically, the Board in Konami considered whether a method claim"0 which made
67 Id. (citations omitted).
68 Id.
69 Decision T 0928/03-3.5.01 (Tech. Bd. App. June 2, 2006), available at http://legal.european-
patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t030928eu1 .pdf.
70 The method claim in Konami is as follows:
6. A guide displaying method for use in a video game system of the type in which
a couple of teams, each having a plurality of player characters (P1, P2, P3)
displayed on a monitor screen (13), compete with each other on a single game
medium (B), at least one of said teams being under the control of a game player
through a controller (8), said guide displaying method comprising.
identifying the player character (P1), which keeps that game medium (B); and
displaying a guide mark (G1, G2), which accompanies the identified player
character (P1) and which indicates that said game medium (B) is kept by said
identified player character,
characterized in that
[a] said guide mark (G1, G2) is ring-shaped and displayed on the image of the
field plane (F) around the player character (P1, P2, P3) at a location near a
[indefinite article reinserted by the Board] foot of said player character (P1, P2,
P3),
[b] wherein the displaying step further displays a pass guide mark (G3)
accompanying another player character (P2), which belongs to the same team as
said player character (P1) keeping said game medium (B) and to which said game
medium (B) can most easily be passed from said player character (P1) keeping
said game medium (B), and
[c] wherein said guide displaying means displays said pass guide mark (G3)
accompanying another player character (P2) such that [corrected from "said"] a
portion of the pass guide mark (G3) is displayed on the end of the display area
even when said another player character (P2) and said pass guide mark (G3)
[Vol. 15:239
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a concealed indicator in a video game visible on a display screen was an invention
under Article 52." Specifically, the Board stated that:
Eligibility for patent protection has not been called into question
by the Examining Division. The guide display device according to
claim 1 indeed represents a physical endty in particular comprising
displaying means which have a technical character by their nature.
The displaying steps of the independent method claim imply the
use of displaying means which provides a technical character to the
method. 2
Thus, the Board used the physical feature of a "displaying means" in the method
claim to form the conclusion that the method claim was an invention under
Article 52.
e. The Walker Case. In another example of the Board's use of physical
features in an Article 52 analysis, the Board in Text processor! Walker (Walker)
considered whether a method claim for enhancing text presentation on a display
was an invention under Article 52Y The Board relied upon the claimed
come out of the display area of the monitor screen so as to properly indicate the
direction in which the game medium (B) is to be passed by the player character
(P1).
Id. at 3-4.
7" Id. at 8-9.
72 Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
73 Id
14 Decision T 0049/04-3.4.03, 2-3 (rech. Bd. App. Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://legal.euro
pean-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t040049eu1.pdf. Method claim 1 of Walker is as follows:
1. A method for enhancing text presentation from a machine readable natural
language text based on reader specific parameters including at least the viewing
field dimensions comprising-
(a) parsing said text into punctuation and parts of speech for extracting text
specific attributes;
(b) storing said text specific attributes in relation to the parts of speech to
produce an enriched text;
(c) applying primary folding rules followed by secondary folding rules to said
enriched text, applied in order of a folding rule rank thereby dividing said text
into text segments said folding rules having at least said punctuation attributes
and parts of speech attributes as inputs and visual attributes as outputs;
(d) applying secondary folding rules until a limit is reached, this limit
preferably being the minimum line length; and
(e) wherein the visual attributes include the displaying of the text segments
in new lines;
(0 applying text segment horizontal displacement rules to said text segments
to determine a horizontal displacement for each text segment, said horizontal
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invention's implementation in a "computer," as revealed by the following portion
of Walker
It follows from the terms used in claim 1 ("machine readable
natural language text", "parsing said text", "storing said text ... to
produce an enriched text", "displaying... across a display") that the
method steps are to be implemented on a computer although this
is not explicitly specified in the claim. Therefore the method of
claim 1 meets the criteria set out in T 258/03 (Auction
method/HITACHI OJ EPO 2004, 575) for being an invention
within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC. This applies afortiori to
the subject matter of independent device claim 12.
The Board reasoned that because method claim 1 was implemented on a physical
computer, method claim 1 recited patentable subject matter under Article 52.76
The Board decided this even though method claim 1 did not explicitly recite a
computer.77 The Board's language may be interpreted to mean that a physical
feature may be found in a claim either. explicitly or implicitly by examining the
claim language. The explicit or implicit physical feature may then be used as the
basis for a patentability determination under Article 52.f The Man Case. In an opinion that both supported the notion that
physical features, such as a computer, may be implied from the claim language and
further strengthened the Board's line of cases basing "technical character" on the
presence of physical features, the Board, in Provision ofproduct-specific data/MAN
(Man), considered an apparatus claim and corresponding method claim that
provided "product-specific data in a service station for recognition and editing of
design and function states. 78 Specifically, the Board stated:
displacement rules including parts of speech as inputs and visual attributes of
horizontal displacement as outputs to produce an enhanced text; and
(g) displaying said enhanced text by cascading the text segments in lines down
and across a display.
Id.
I d. at 6-7 (internal reference omitted).
76 id
77 Id at 6.
78 Decision T 1242/04-3.5.01, 07/2007 O.J. E.P.O. 421,424 (Tech. App. Bd. 2007), availabk at
http://www.european-patcnt-office.org/epo/pubs/ojOO7/0707/07-4217.pdf. The apparatus claim
in Man is as follows:
10. System for providing product specific data in a service station for
recognition and editing of design and function states, characterised by
a central database (1) for storing and providing equipment data for product
components of all product types and the different variants, the equipment data
[Vol. 15:239
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Apart from the fact that, in keeping with T 931/95, even the
apparatus category of claim 10 implies the presence of physical
features and hence a technical character, both of the independent
claims feature at least a central database for recording the required
status and an archive store for recording the actual status which
communicate with each other by computing means, which implies
the use of a computer. Thus independent method claim I also uses
technical means and in keeping with T 258/03 involves more than
a purely abstract concept. Thus independent claims 1 and 10 both
have a technical character and constitute inventions within the
meaning of Article 52(1) EPC.7 9
In the cited portion of Man, the Board strongly equated the presence of a physical
feature in the claim and the presence of technical character,' the latter being the
key indicator of patentability under Article 52.1 In particular, the Board stated
that "the apparatus category of claim 10 implies the presence ofphysicalfeatures and
hence a technical character."' 2 In this case, the particular physical feature that was
impliedly found in the claim was a "computer."83
being updated by the manufacturer;
an archive store (3) in which is archived for each delivered product at least
one dedicated data file (2) which can be retrieved via an identification code
assigned thereto and which contains the individual equipment data of the
particular delivered product (7), wherein
multiple user interfaces (5) are to be connected to the archive store (3) by
telecommunication;
a computer-assisted program (4) which communicates with the central
database (1) and the archive store (3) to generate new and/or updated data files
and store them in the archive store (3);
multiple service stations with at least one user interface (5) via which a data
file (2) allocated to the particular product (7) can be retrieved from the archive
store (3) for editing of that product (7); and
equipment data for the product (7), comprising information on product
components, hardware and software and on individual settings of product
components, with changes to the individual product being stored in sequential
data file versions (2) in the archive store (3); and
data file versions (2(1.,) stored in the archive store (3) reflecting the
chronological sequence of changes to the particular product (7).
Id
79 Id. at 428.
so Id
s See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
82 Man, supra note 78, at 428 (emphasis added).
83 Id
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In summary, these cases adjudicated by the Board reveal that the Board has
relied almost exclusively on the presence of a physical feature in a claimed
invention to determine whether the claimed invention is an invention under
Article 52. In those cases, the Board consistently identified one or more physical
features from the claim at issue and held that the claim had a "technical character"
on the basis of the identified physical features.' Also, in each decision, the
physical features identified by the Board were hardware components of a
computer. The following table shows the physical features identified by the
Board to reach a conclusion that a claimed invention is patentable under
Article 52:
CASE "INVENTION" UNDER PHYSICAL FEATURE
ARTICLE 52? IDENTIFIED BY BOARD AS
LENDING TECHNICAL
CHARACTER
Auction Method Yes (1) Server computer, (2)
client computers, and (3)
network
Duns Licensing Yes Processor
Microsoft Yes (1) Clipboard, which
Board interpreted as
"memory" and (2)
computer-readable
medium
Konami Yes Displaying means
Walker Yes Computer (implied from
language of the claim)
Man Yes Computer (implied from
language of the claim)
Each of the features identified by the Board was either explicitly included in
the claim or was implied from the language of the claim. In Microsoft, the Board
also used another factor to determine whether a computer program claim was an
invention under Article 52. Namely, the Board considered the effect of a
' See, e.g., id.
[Vol. 15:239
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computer program claim on the internal operation of the computer."'
Nonetheless, the Board also identified the physical feature of a computer-readable
medium as lending technical character to the computer program claim.8 6 In
conclusion, recent cases adjudicated by the Board have relied heavily, if not
exclusively, on the explicit or implicit presence of a physical feature relating to
computers in the claimed invention to reach a determination of patentability
under Article 52.
B. UNITED STATES LAW REGARDING PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE-RELATED
INVENTIONS HAS GENERALLY EVOLVED TO INCLUDE A PHYSICALITY
REQUIREMENT
1. Case Law from the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Indicates a Gradual Evolution Toward a Physicaliy Requirement. In
contrast to the relatively straightforward approach used by the Board, the U.S.
Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) have used a more labyrinthian approach to determining patentability.
Indeed, one may easily get the impression that the patentability of software-
related inventions in the United States is not yet fully resolved. However, recent
cases from the Federal Circuit have made a significant move away from these
labyrinthian approaches in favor of an approach that provides a higher degree of
certainty.87 The conclusion may be drawn from these more recent cases that the
United States has moved towards a physicality requirement that approximates that
found in the European approach.
In U.S. law, the "first door which must be opened on the difficult path to
patentability is [35 U.S.C.] § 1o1."s8s Indeed, "[o]nly if the requirements of S 101
are satisfied is the inventor 'allowed to pass through to' the other requirements
for patentability, such as novelty under § 102 and, of pertinence to this case, non-
obviousness under § 103. " 89 Generally speaking, Congress intended statutory
subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."90
Nonetheless, 35 U.S.C. § 101 limits patentable subject matter as follows:
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
85 See Microsoft, supra note 11, at 10-11.
86 Id.
87 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cit. 2007); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
"6 Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1371 (citing State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149
F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cit. 1998)).
88 Id. at 1371 (citation omitted).
o Diamond v. Chakrabarry, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citation omitted); S. REP. No. 82-1979,
at 2399 (1952).
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manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this tide."9' The Federal Circuit has stated that "[t]he repetitive use of the
expansive term 'any' in § 101 shows Congress's intent not to place any restrictions
on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond those
specifically recited in § 101."9' Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas are excluded from patentability.93 Also, certain types of mathematical
subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until
reduced to some type of practical application.94
The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter should
focus on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its
practical utility.9" Furthermore, insignificant post-solution activity will not
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process." A claim drawn
to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply
because the claim recites a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital
computer.9" Several important cases adjudicated by the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit have shed light on these general rules of patentability under 5 101.
a. Diehr. In Diehr, decided in 1981, the Supreme Court considered a claimed
process for "molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products."
9
91 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
92 State Street Bank, 149 F.2d at 1373.
3 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373; In
re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed.
Cit. 1992).
14 Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1543.
91 State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.
96 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183.
97 Id. at 187;Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544.
" Diebr, 450 U.S. at 177. Method claim 1, which is an example of the claimed invention, is as
follows:
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded
compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising.
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least,
natural logarithm conversion data (In),
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said
compound being molded, and
a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of
the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
20
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The claimed process used a computer to calculate curing times based on an inputted
temperature measurement. 99
The Supreme Court observed that "[t]ransformation and reduction of an
article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines."'' "t The Court held that the
claimed invention "involve[d] the transformation of an article, in this case raw
uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing."'0 ' Therefore, the
claimed invention was patentable under § 101 )02
The Supreme Court then considered the effects that computer-related aspects
of the claimed invention had on the patentability of the claim. As an initial
matter, the Court found that the claimed invention was directed toward a process
of curing synthetic rubber and was not solely directed toward a mathematical
formula. 3 Referring to the rule that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical
formula, computer program, or digital computer," the Supreme Court found that
the claimed invention's use of a computer did not preclude patentability.' 4
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated, "one does not need a 'computer' to cure
natural or synthetic rubber, but if the computer use incorporated in the process
patent significantly lessens the possibility of 'overcuring' or 'undercuring,' the
process as a whole does not thereby become unpatentable subject matter. ' °
Referring to the claimed invention's use of the Arrhenius' equation, the Court
stated that "Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation, but when a process
for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more efficient solution of
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each
cure, [integrations to calculate from the series of temperature
determinations] the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure,
which is
nv = CZ + x
where v is the total required cure time,
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during
the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with
the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates
equivanence.
Id. at 81 n.5.
99 Id at 178-79.
o Id. at 184 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (building on an earlier
analysis of a process's eligibility for protection in Cochran v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1877))).
101 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
102 IL
103 Id. at 187.
104 Id
1os Id.
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the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the threshold by
§ 101.'"16 Finally, foreshadowing a similar rule stated by the Boards of Appeal of
the European Patent Office, the Court also determined that issues of novelty
should not be considered when determining whether a claimed invention is
patentable under § 1o1.'07
b. Arrhythmia. In Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,1'0 the
Federal Circuit considered whether method claims 0 9 and apparatus claims,"1
which were each directed to the analysis of electrocardiographic signals of the
heart function, constituted statutory subject matter under § 101. The invention,
as recited in the claims and described in the specification, required certain steps
to be conducted with the aid of a computer.'
106 Id. at 188.
107 id
108 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
'0 Method claim 1 in Arrhythmia is as follows:
1. A method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the presence
or absence of a predetermined level of high frequency energy in the late QRS
signal, comprising the steps of:
converting a series of QRS signals to time segments, each segment having a
digital value equivalent to the analog value of said signals at said time;
applying a portion of said time segments in reverse time order to high pass
filter means;
determining an arithmetic value of the amplitude of the output of said
filter; and
comparing said value with said predetermined level.
Id. at 1055.
... Apparatus claim 7 in Arrhythmia is as follows:
1. Apparatus for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the level
of high frequency energy in the late QRS signal comprising-
means for converting X, Y, and Z lead electrocardiographic input signals
to digital valued time segments;
means for examining said X, Y, and Z digital valued time segments and
selecting therefrom the QRS waveform portions thereof;
means for signal averaging a multiplicity of said selected QRS waveforms
for each of said X, Y, and Z inputs and providing composite, digital X, Y, and
Z QRS waveforms;
high pass filter means;
means for applying to said filter means, in reverse time order, the anterior
portion of each said digital X, Y, and Z waveform; and
means for comparing the output of said filter means with a predetermined
level to obtain an indication of the presence of a high frequency, low level,
energy component in the filter output of said anterior portions.
Id .
SId
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The Federal Circuit, after citing Diehr with approval, set forth the two-part
Freeman-Walter-Abele test for whether a computer-related claim is statutory subject
matter under § 101.112 The court also qualified the Freeman-Walter-Abele test by
stating that it was not the only test for statutory subject matter and that the
Federal Circuit had, on previous occasions, stated that failure to meet the test may
not always defeat the claim." 3 Specifically, the court set forth the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test as follows:
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is recited
directly or indirectly in the claim. If so, it is next determined
whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than the
algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is directed to a
mathematical algorithm that is not applied to or limited by physical
elements or process steps. Such claims are nonstatutory. However,
when the mathematical algorithm is applied in one or more steps of
an otherwise statutory process claim, or one or more elements of an
otherwise statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of section 101
are met.
114
The Federal Court, in Arrhythmia, also quoted In re Abele, in which the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals explained:
Patentable subject matter [is not limited] to claims in which
structural relationships or process steps are defined, limited or
refined by the application of the algorithm.
Rather, Walter should be read as requiring no more than that the
algorithm be "applied in any manner to physical elements or
process steps," provided that its application is circumscribed by
more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution
activity." 
5
The court further explained that "the emphasis is 'on what the claimed method
steps do rather than how the steps are performed.' "116 Thus, the Federal Circuit
recognized the importance of physical elements or process steps in the
patentability of process claims.
112 Id. at 1058-61.
113 Id. at 1058.
114 Id
11 Id (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
116 Id. at 1058 (quoting Ex Parte Logan, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,1468 (P.T.O. Bd. Pat. App.
& Interf. 1991)).
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Applying the first part of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to the method claim, the
Federal Circuit determined that a mathematical algorithm was included in the
subject matter of the method claim. 7 Turning to the second part of the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test, the court determined what the claimed process did. The court
used the preamble of the method claim to determine that the claimed process was
a "method for analyzing electrocardiograph signals to determine the presence or
absence of a predetermined level of high frequency energy in the late QRS
signal.""' 8 The court found that the claim included physical process steps that
transform analog electrocardiograph signals into corresponding digital signals."9
The court also found that the analog signals were not abstractions, but were
related to a patient's heart function. 2 ' The court also observed that "[t]he
resultant output is not an abstract number, but is a signal related to the patient's
heart activity.' 12' Using these aforementioned operations, the court concluded
that the second part of the Freeman-Walter-Abel test was met because "the steps
of Simson's claimed method comprise an otherwise statutory process whose
mathematical procedures are applied to physical process steps."'' 2 In particular,
the court concluded that the "claimed steps of 'converting', 'applying',
'determining', and 'comparing' are physical process steps that transform one
physical, electrical signal into another," and that signals may be physical. 23
Turning to the apparatus claims, the court first pointed out that the apparatus
was claimed using "means plus function" clauses, thereby necessitating use of the
specification to determine the nature of the apparatus.'24 The court identified
physical features in the specification that were used to implement functions for
the claimed apparatus, including an analog-to-digital converter, a minicomputer,
electrical signals, disc memory unit, connecting leads, and a processing unit.
2
After stating these physical features, the court concluded that apparatus claims are
statutory under § 101, as "[tlhe computer-performed operations transform a
particular input signal to a different output signal, in accordance with the internal
structure of the computer as configured by electronic instructions.' 26 Finally, in
a nod to Diebr, the court observed that "[t]he use of mathematical formulae or
relationships to describe the electronic structure and operation of an apparatus
"1 Id at 1059.
118 Id
119 Id.
120 Id
121 I d
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See id at 1060 (stating how the claim meets the format provided for in 35 U.S.C. 5 112, 6).
125 Id.
126 id
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does not make it nonstatutory.' 12 ' Thus, the Federal Circuit, in analyzing both the
method claims and the apparatus claims under the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,
placed emphasis on the presence of physical features and transformation of
physical features from one form to another.
c. Schrader. About two years after Arrhytbmia, the Federal Circuit once
again had occasion to apply the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in In re Schrader'28 This
time, the court considered a claimed invention that was directed to a method of
competitively bidding on a plurality of related items. 29 The case is of particular
interest because of the factual similarities with Auction Method, which was
discussed in Part I.A.l.a.'3° However, unlike in Auction Metbod, the claimed
invention in Schrader did not involve the use of a computer to implement the
claimed steps.'
Regarding the first step of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, the Federal Circuit
observed that Gottscbalk "defines a 'mathematical algorithm' for purpose of§ 101
as a 'procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem .... , ,132 Based
on this observation, the court found that a mathematical algorithm was implicitly
included in the method claim because the claim language "assembling a
completion" was a procedure for .solving the mathematical problem of
determining the optimal combination of bids.'33 The court also noted that even
simple algorithms, such as simple addition, might be considered to be
mathematical algorithms.'
34
The court then turned to the second part of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. The
court confirmed that "a process claim [in] compliance with § 101 requires some
Id (citing In rr Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
125 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
129 Id The method claim at issue in Scbrader is as follows:
1. A method of competitively bidding on a plurality of items comprising the
steps of identifying a plurality of related items in a record, offering said plurality
of items to a plurality of potential bidders, receiving bids from said bidders for
both individual ones of said items and a plurality of groups of said items, each
of said groups including one or more of said items, said items and groups being
any number of all of said individual ones and all of the possible combinations of
said items, entering said bids in said record, indexing each of said bids to one of
said individual ones or said groups of said items, and assembling a completion
of all said bids on said items and groups, said completion identifying a bid for all
of said items at a prevailing total price, identifying in said record all of said bids
corresponding to said prevailing total price.
Id. at 292.
130 See supra Part I.A.
131 See Scbrader, 22 F.3d at 292.
132 Id at 293 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)).
133 Id at 292.
134 Id. at 293.
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kind of transformation or reduction of subject matter .... "'35 The court
emphasized that the claims in Arrhythmia "all involved the transformation or
conversion of subject matter representative of or constituting physical activity or
objects."' 36 In particular, the physical activity in Arrythmia was electrocardiograph
signals representative of human cardiac activity.'37 In contrast, the court found
that "Schrader's claims, except for incidental changes to a 'record,' do not reflect
any transformation or conversion of subject matter representative of or
constituting physical activity or objects."' 38 Specifically, because "there is nothing
physical about bids per se[,] . . . the grouping or regrouping of bids cannot
constitute a physical change, effect, or result.'
39
The court also emphasized that "the recitation of insignificant post-solution
activity in a claim involving the solving of a mathematical algorithm [cannot]
impart patentability to [a] claim."'" For Schrader's method claims, the step of
entering data into a 'record' was found to be implicit in any application of a
mathematical algorithm, and was therefore too insignificant to impart patentability
to the claim.'
4
'
In contrast to Auction Method, the Federal Circuit in Schrader found that the
claimed auction method did constitute statutory subject matter.142 However, one
significant difference exists between the auction methods in each of these two
cases. In Auction Method, the auction method claim was implemented by a
computer and included physical computer features to implement the claim.' 4 No
such physical computer features were included in the auction method claim in
Schrader. This difference is significant because in Auction Method, the Boards of
Appeal of the European Patent Office actually relied on the presence of physical
computer features, such as the server computer, client computers, and the
network to find that the auction method was patentable. Because the court in
Schrader relied heavily on the need for a physical transformation, and because the
presence of a computer would not make "bids" physical objects, some doubt
exists as to whether the Federal Circuit would have reached the same conclusion
as the Board if the auction method in Schrader had been implemented by a
computer.
d. Alappat. In the same year that Schraderwas decided, the Federal Circuit,
in Alappat, considered whether an apparatus claim was a mathematical algorithm
135 Id at 295 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)).
'36 Id at 294.
137 Id.
138 Id
"9 Id. at 293-94.
140 Id at 294.
141 Id
142 Id.
143 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
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and therefore excluded from patentability under § 101.' In particular, the
apparatus claim in Alappat was directed to a rasterizer for converting vectors in
a data list representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased
pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means. 4 '
The court held that the claimed apparatus constituted a "machine" that
produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result under § 101.1' Specifically, the
claimed apparatus "as a whole is directed to a combination of interrelated
elements which combine to form a machine for converting discrete waveform
data samples into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on
a display means.""14 Further, the inclusion of a mathematical algorithm in the
apparatus claim did not preclude patentability, as the apparatus claim was "not 'so
abstract and sweeping' that it would 'wholly pre-empt' the use of any apparatus
employing the combination of mathematical calculations recited therein.'
148
Importantly, Alappat determined the patentability of an apparatus claim made
up of "means-plus-function" clauses. 4 9 In one section of the opinion dedicated
entirely to the interpretation of the means-plus-function clauses, the court
imported several hardware features, such as logic circuits and read-only memory,
into the apparatus claim.' Therefore, the court was mindful of, and possibly
reliant upon, these physical features when deciding that the apparatus claim was
a "machine"'' under § 101.
The court also rejected the reasoning of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences that the apparatus claim was unpatentable merely because the claim
reads on a general-purpose "digital computer 'means' to perform the various steps
'" In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The apparatus claim in Alappat is as
follows:
15. A rasterizer for converting vector list data representing sample magnitudes
of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be
displayed on a display means comprising:
(a) means for determining a vertical distance between the endpoints of each
of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned
by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined
function of the normalized vertical distance and elevation.
Id. at 1538-39.
145 Id
146 Id at 1541, 1544.
147 Id. at 1544.
148 Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68-72 (1972)).
149 Id. at 1540-42.
"0 Id. at 1541.
1s' Id. at 1541-42.
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under program control."'' 1 2 In rejecting the view of the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences, the court stated that "a computer operating pursuant to
software may represent patentable subject matter, provided, of course, that the
claimed subject matter meets all of the other requirements of Title 35. ' 53
e. Warmerdam. In the same year that Shrader and A/appat were decided,
the Federal Circuit also decided In re Warmerdam.'" In Warmerdam, the court
considered the patentability of method claims directed towards controlling "the
motion of objects and machines, such as robotic machines, to avoid collision with
other moving or fixed objects."' 55 The court declined to follow the Freeman-
Walter-Abele test or any approach that centered on whether the claim involved a
mathematical algorithm. Specifically, the court provided the following critique of
this line of cases:
Within Supreme Court guidance, this court and its predecessor,
as well as the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), have sought to
find more precise definitions for the things excluded, but without
complete success. One notion that emerged and has been invoked
in the computer related cases is that a patent cannot be obtained for
a "mathematical algorithm." That rule is generally applied through
a two-step protocol known as the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,
developed by our predecessor court, the first step of which is to
determine whether a mathematical algorithm is recited directly or
indirectly in the claim, and the second step of which is to determine
whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than the
algorithm itself.
The difficulty is that there is no clear agreement as to what is a
"mathematical algorithm", which makes rather dicey the
determination of whether the claim as a whole is no more than that.
An alternative to creating these arbitrary definitional terms which
deviate from those used in the statute may lie simply in returning to
the language of the statute and the Supreme Court's basic principles
1-2 Id. at 1545-46.
153 Id.
'54 In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
155 Id. at 1355. Method claim 1 in Warmerdam is as follows:
1. A method for generating a data structure which represents the shape of [sic]
physical object in a position and/or motion control machine as a hierarchy of
bubbles, comprising the steps of:
first locating the medial axis of the object and
then creating a hierarchy of bubbles on the medial axis.
Id at 1357.
[Vol. 15:239
28
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol15/iss2/1
KEEPING IT PHYSICAL
as enunciated in Diebr, and eschewing efforts to describe
nonstatutory subject matter in other terms. 56
The rule by which the court determined the patentability of the method claims
in Warmerdam was formulated in accordance with these criticisms. Specifically,
after dedicating several paragraphs to the issue of whether the method claims
included mathematical subject matter, the court stated as follows:
Compounding the difficulty of resolving the issue in
"mathematical algorithm" terms is the lack of agreement, as
previously noted, about the proper meaning of the label
mathematical algorithm. We need not resolve the issue in these
terms because we find that regardless whether the claim can be said
to recite indirectly or directly a mathematical algorithm, the
dispositive issue for assessing compliance with § 101 in this case is
whether the claim is for a process that goes beyond simply
manipulating "abstract ideas" or "natural phenomena."'
157
Using this approach, the court determined that the method claim in Warmerdam
"involves no more than the manipulation of abstract ideas."'5 8 In particular, the
court determined that the recited steps of "locating a medial axis" and "creating
a bubble hierarchy" involved no more than the manipulation of abstract ideas.'5 9
The Federal Circuit's approach in Warmerdam represents a significant break from
the previous jurisprudence that centered on the concept of a mathematical
algorithm.
f. State Street Bank and Beauregard. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Finance Group, the Federal Circuit all but discarded the use of the Freeman-
Wlalter-Abele test in determining patentability and instead placed focus on the
practical utility of a claimed invention.6 In that case, the court considered the
patentability, under § 101, of a means-plus-function claim directed to "[a] data
processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio
established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of funds."'' As
156 Id at 1358-59 (citations omitted).
157 Id. at 1360 (citation omitted).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
161 Id The apparatus claim in State Street Bank, including in brackets the structural elements
determined by the court to correspond to the means recited in the claim, is as follows:
1. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of
a portfolio established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of
funds, comprising-
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an initial matter, the court held that the claimed invention constituted a
"machine" and therefore fell within a patentable subject matter category under
§ 101.162
The court proceeded to determine whether the claimed invention fell within
a "mathematical algorithm" or "business method" exception to statutory subject
matter. Regarding whether the claimed invention fell under the mathematical
algorithm exception, the court revisited Alappat and Arrhythmia and categorized
each as involving claimed inventions that corresponded to or produced a useful,
concrete, and tangible result.'63 The court then stated that "the Freeman-W/alter-
Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory
subject matter.' '164 Setting forth what it believed to be the correct approach, the
court stated that "[t]he question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject
matter should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim
is directed to-process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter-but
(a) computer processor means [a personal computer including a CPU] for
processing data;
(b) storage means [a data disk] for storing data on a storage medium;
(c) first means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to prepare the data disk
to magnetically store selected data] for initializing the storage medium;
(d) second means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve
information from a specific file, calculate incremental increases or decreases
based on specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis, and store the
output in a separate file] for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and
each of the funds from a previous day and data regarding increases or decreases
in each of the funds, [sic, funds] assets and for allocating the percentage share
that each fund holds in the portfolio;
(e) third means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information
from a specific file, calculate incremental increases and decreases based on
specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and store the output in
a separate file] for processing data regarding daily incremental income, expenses,
and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among
each fund;
(f) fourth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information
from a specific file, calculate incremental increases and decreases based on
specific input, allocate the results on a percentage basis and store the output in
a separate file] for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or loss for
the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and
(g) fifth means [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to retrieve information
from specific files, calculate that information on an aggregate basis and store the
output in a separate file] for processing data regarding aggregate year-end
income, expenses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds.
Id. at 1371-72.
162 Id.
163 Id at 1372-73.
164 Id. at 1374.
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rather on the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its
practical utility."'
65
The court also placed great emphasis on whether the claimed invention
produced a useful, concrete, and tangible result. 66 Using this approach, the court
held as follows:
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing
discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a
practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or
calculation, because it produces "a useful, concrete and tangible
result" - a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and
reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory
authorities and in subsequent trades.
67
The court also used its decision in State Street Bank as an opportunity to lay to rest
the "ill-conceived" business method exception to patentable subject matter. 68
Thus, State Street Bank diminished the importance of the formulistic
categorizations attributed to some claims, such as mathematical algorithm and
business method, and instead focused on the practical utility of the claimed
invention and whether the claimed invention had a useful, concrete, and tangible
result.
In 1995, the Federal Circuit heard an appeal from Gary M. Beauregard in the
case of In re Beauregard.69 The controversy in that case originated when the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejected Beauregard's computer program
claims on the basis of the printed matter doctrine. 7 ° However, the Commissioner
of Patent and Trademarks (Commissioner), in a significant concession, agreed
with Beauregard's position on appeal that the printed matter doctrine was not
applicable.'' The Commissioner stated "that computer programs embodied in
a tangible medium, such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.1 2 This
case has been relied on to support the patentability of computer program product
claims by embodying the computer program product in a tangible medium.
165 Id. at 1375.
'" Id. at 1374-75.
167 Id. at 1373.
168 Id. at 1375.
'69 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
170 Id.
"' Id. at 1584.
172 Id. at 1583.
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g. Recent Decisions Suggesting a Pbysicaity Requirement. Most recently, on
September 20, 2007, the Federal Circuit released two important opinions
pertaining to the patentability of software-related inventions. The first case, In re
Comisky,173 appears to take the determination of patentability under § 101 a step
closer to the physicality approach seen in the cases by the Boards of Appeal of the
European Patent Office and discussed in Part L.A above. In Comiskgy, the court
determined whether a method and system for mandatory arbitration involving
legal documents, such as wills and contracts, were statutory subject matter under
§ 101.'7' The parties agreed that the independent claims did not require the use
of a mechanical device, such as a computer. 175 However, some of the dependent
claims did require such devices.1
76
The Federal Circuit clarified its holding in State Street Bank by upholding, in
Comiskgy, the lack of any bright line rule excluding business methods from
patentability. Specifically, the court stated that "[a]lthough it has been suggested
that State Street Bank supports the patentability of business methods generally,
"' 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
174 Id. at 1369. The method claim in Comiskqy is as follows:
1. A method for mandatory arbitration resolution regarding one or more
unilateral documents comprising the steps of:
enrolling a person and one or more unilateral documents associated with the
person in a mandatory arbitration system at a time prior to or as of the time of
creation of or execution of the one or more unilateral documents;
incorporating arbitration language, that is specific to the enrolled person, in
the previously enrolled unilateral document wherein the arbitration language
provides that any contested issue related to the unilateral document must be
presented to the mandatory arbitration system, in which the person and the one
or more unilateral documents are enrolled, for binding arbitration wherein the
contested issue comprises one or more of a challenge to the documents,
interpretation of the documents, interpretation or application of terms of the
documents and execution of the documents or terms of the documents;
requiring a complainant to submit a request for arbitration resolution to the
mandatory arbitration system wherein the request is directed to the contested
issue related to the unilateral document containing the arbitration language;
conducting arbitration resolution for the contested issue related to the
unilateral document in response to the request for arbitration resolution;
providing support to the arbitration; and
determining an award or a decision for the contested issue related to the
unilateral document in accordance with the incorporated arbitration language,
wherein the award or the decision is final and binding with respect to the
complainant.
Id at 1369 n.1.
175 Comiskgy, 499 F.3d at 1369.
176 id
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State StreetBank explicitly held that business methods are 'subject to the same legal
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.' ,,177
The Federal Circuit then upheld the bedrock rule that abstract ideas, without
more, may not be patented under § 101 and explained the reasoning behind that
rule. 7 1 Specifically, the court stated that "[t]he prohibition against the patenting
of abstract ideas has two distinct (though related) aspects. First, when an abstract
concept has no claimed practical application, it is not patentable.' 7 9 Second, even
if the abstract concept may have a practical application,
the Supreme Court has held that a claim reciting an algorithm or
abstract idea can state statutory subject matter only if, as employed
in the process, it is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or
otherwise involves another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. As the PTO
notes, "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only two instances in
which such a method may qualify as a section 101 process: when
the process 'either [1] was tied to a particular apparatus' or [2]
operated to change materials to a 'different state or thing.' "...
Thus, a claim that involves both a mental process and one of the
other categories of statutory subject matter (i.e., a machine,
manufacture, or composition) may be patentable under § 101."s
These statements by the Federal Circuit approach the kind of physicality
requirement seen in cases before the EPO because the court has stated that a
mental process may be statutory as long as a machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter is present in the claim. The court continued, "[f]or
example, we have found processes involving mathematical algorithms used in
computer technology patentable because they claimed practical application and
were tied to specific machines."''
The court then turned to whether the claimed invention recited patentable
subject matter. The appellant had conceded that the method claim, as well as
claim 32, "do not require a machine, and these claims evidently do not describe
a process of manufacture or a process for the alteration of a composition of
matter.' 8 2 The court determined that these claims did not recite statutory subject
matter.
17' Id. at 1374 (footnote omitted) (quoting State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
"78 Id. at 1376-77.
179 Id.
"o Id (citations omitted).
'1 Id at 1377.
182 Id. at 1379.
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On the other hand, claims 17 and 46 in Comiskqy recited "the use of 'modules,'
including 'a registration module for enrolling' a person, 'an arbitration module for
incorporating arbitration language,' and 'an arbitration resolution module for
requiring a complainant [or party] to submit a request for arbitration resolution
to the mandatory arbitration system.' "183 Claim 17 also recited "a means for
selecting an arbitrator from an arbitrator database."' 184 The court determined that
"[t]hese claims, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, could require the
use of a computer as part of Comiskey's arbitration system. '
The court also noted that claims 15, 30, 44, and 58 in Comiskqy recited the
following limitation: "'wherein access to the mandatory arbitration is established
through the Internet, intranet, World Wide Web, software application, telephone,
television, cable, video [or radio], magnetic, electronic communications, or other
communications means."" 86 The court held that these claims claimed patentable
subject matter. In providing rationale for this determination, the court stated that
"[w]hile the mere use of the machine to collect data necessary for application of
the mental process may not make the claim patentable subject matter, these claims
in combining the use of machines with a mental process, claim patentable subject
matter."' 87 Although it contains a minor caveat, this latter statement, especially
when considered along with the aforementioned statements of the Federal Circuit,
appears to state the straightforward principle that a claimed invention that
includes a mental process may be patented if a machine is included in the claims.
Because Comiskqy was recently decided, one can only speculate how the case
will be applied during patent prosecution and in other litigation. However, if
Comiskey is construed as requiring only a physical feature in the claim, such as a
computer or memory, such an interpretation may further strengthen the USPTO's
current common practice of dropping § 101 rejections once a physical feature is
included by amendment in the rejected claim. If Comisk/y is interpreted in such
a bright-line manner, the gap between the patentability requirements in the United
States and in the EPO will have been bridged significantly, as both jurisdictions
would lay significant weight on the involvement, or even mere presence, of a
physical hardware feature in the claimed invention and base patentability on that
physical feature.
On the same day that Comiskgy was decided, the Federal Circuit also decided
In re Nuiten.188 In Nuiten, "[t]he issue before the court [was] whether or not a
183 Id
184 id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1379.
187 Id. at 1380 (citations omitted).
18 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
[Vol. 15:239
34
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol15/iss2/1
KEEPING IT PHYSICAL
signal is patentable subject matter. 1 8 9 Although the issue in Nuitten was relatively
narrow, the case revealed the Federal Circuit's thought process when confronted
with uncharted areas of subject matter. Also, the patentability of signals has
become particularly important because software is now often deployed to
computers over networks, resulting in less reliance on the physical delivery of
software contained in physical media. 9 ° The claim at issue in Nuitten claimed a
signal that used a technique for reducing distortion induced by the introduction
of watermarks into signals.' 9'
The Federal Circuit observed that "[t]he claims on appeal cover transitory
electrical and electromagnetic signals propagating through some medium, such as
wires, air, or a vacuum."' 92 The court also made some observations about signals
generally. Specifically, the court stated that "[a] 'signal' implies signaling-that is,
the conveyance of information. To convey information to a recipient a physical
carrier, such as an electromagnetic wave, is needed. Thus, in order to be a 'signal,'
as required by the claim, some carrier upon which the information is embedded
is required."' 19 The court also noted that "Nuijten and the PTO agree that the
claims include physical but transitory forms of signal transmission such as radio
broadcasts, electrical signals through a wire, and light pulses through a fiber-optic
cable, so long as those transmissions convey information encoded in the manner
disclosed and claimed by Nuijten.' 194
To determine whether the claimed signal was statutory subject matter, the
court "consider[ed] whether a transitory, propagating signal is within any of the
four statutory categories: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter."' 95 In particular, the court stated that "[i]f a claim covers material not
found in any of the four statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly
expressed scope of 5 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and
useful."' 96 The court then proceeded to define each of the four categories of
"9 Id. at 1348.
o SeeJeffrey S. Draeger, Are Beauregard's Claims Real# Vaid, 17 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER&
INFO. L. 347, 373 & n.105 (1998) (noting that "Internet transmissions are becoming an increasingly
important channel of software distribution"').
191 Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1351. The signal claim in Nuiten is as follows:
14. A signal with embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded in
accordance with a given encoding process and selected samples of the signal
representing the supplemental data, and at least one of the samples preceding the
selected samples is different from the sample corresponding to the given
encoding process.
Id.
192 Id. at 1352.
193 Id. at 1353.
194 d
195 Id.
196 Id. at 1354.
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statutory subject matter and determine whether the claimed signal fell under any
of the categories.
1 9 7
The court first addressed whether the claimed signal was a "process."'"8 The
court stated that "[t]he Supreme Court and this court have consistently
interpreted the statutory term 'process' to require action."' 99 Based on this
definition, the court concluded that "[s~ince a process claim must cover an act or
series of acts and Nuijten's signal claims do not, the claims are not directed to a
process.
' 2 °°
The court then cited the Supreme Court's definition of "machine" as " 'a
concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of
devices.' This 'includes every mechanical device or combination of mechanical
powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or
result.' ,201 Based on this definition, the court found that "[a] transitory signal
made of electrical or electromagnetic variances is not made of 'parts' or 'devices'
in any mechanical sense."2 2
The court then cited the Supreme Court's definition of "manufacture" as
"'the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to
these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by
hand-labor or by machinery.' , 203 The court observed that "articles" are "tangible
articles or commodities."2' Based on these definitions, the Federal Circuit
determined that "[a] transient electric or electromagnetic transmission does not
fit within that definition., 20 1 Justifying this conclusion, the court stated:
While such a transmission is man-made and physical-it exists in
the real world and has tangible causes and effects-it is a change in
electric potential that, to be perceived, must be measured at a
certain point in space and time by equipment capable of detecting
and interpreting the signal.206
Finally, the court cited the Supreme Court's definition of "composition of
matter" as " 'all compositions of two or more substances and all composite
articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture,
197 Id at 1354-58.
'98 Id. at 1354-55.
199 Id. at 1354.
20 Id. at 1355.
201 Id
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1356.
M4id.
205 Id.
MI6
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or whether they be gases, fluids, powers or solids.' ,,27 Based on this definition,
the court found that the claimed signal was not a composition of matter.20 1 Thus,
signals, such as the one claimed in Nuiten, are not patentable subject matter
because they do not fall into a § 101 category.2° The impact of this decision on
software-related inventions, especially those that are deployed over networks,
remains to be seen.
2. The Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions. In 1996, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office released the Examination Guidelines for Computer-
Related Inventions (Guidelines) to assist U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
personnel in the examination of patent applications. 21 The Guidelines greatly
extrapolate the binding case law of the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit and are
introduced with the following significant qualification:
These Guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking and
hence do not have the force and effect of law. These Guidelines
have been designed to assist Office personnel in analyzing claimed
subject matter for compliance with substantive law. Rejections will
be based upon the substantive law and it is these rejections which
are appealable. Consequently, any failure by Office personnel to
follow the Guidelines is neither appealable nor petitionable.
The Guidelines alter the procedures Office personnel will follow
when examining applications drawn to computer-related inventions
and are equally applicable to claimed inventions implemented in
either hardware or software. The Guidelines also clarify the
Office's position on certain patentability standards related to this
field of technology. Office personnel are to rely on these
Guidelines in the event of any inconsistent treatment of issues
between these Guidelines and any earlier provided guidance from
the Office.2 '
Hence, although the Guidelines may be helpful in understanding the processes of
the USPTO, they should not be accorded too much weight. The jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit, as seen in the cases discussed above,
takes precedence over the Guidelines.2"
207 Id. at 1357 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
208 Id.
209 Id
210 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb. 28,1996).
211 Id. at 7479.
212 See id. (stating that the Guidelines do not have the effect of law).
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The Guidelines, after giving a brief primer on case law regarding § 101, go on
to identify categories of non-statutory subject matter. The first category described
is "Functional Descriptive Material," or more specifically, " 'Data Structures'
Representing Descriptive Material Per Se or Computer Programs Representing
Computer Listings Per Se."213 This category relates generally to data structures
and computer programs that are not embodied on a computer-readable
medium.214 The second category is "Non-Functional Descriptive Material," "such
as music, literature, art, photographs, and mere arrangements or compilations of
facts or data. 215 The third category of nonstatutory subject matter is "Natural
Phenomena Such as Electricity and Magnetism. "216
The Guidelines then describe categories of statutory subject matter.217 The
Guidelines first list categories of statutory product claims. 218 The first category
of statutory product claims consists of claims that encompass any machine or
manufacture embodiment of a process.219 Under this category, "[i]f a claim is
found to encompass any and every product embodiment of the underlying
process, and if the underlying process is statutory, the product claim should be
classified as a statutory product."'  The second category of statutory product
claims consists of claims directed to specific machines and manufactures."'
Under this category, "[a] claim limited to a specific machine or manufacture,
which has a practical application in the technological arts, is statutory."'  The
Guidelines also add that "[i]n most cases, a claim to a specific machine or
manufacture will have a practical application in the technological arts.
223
The Guidelines then describe types of statutory process claims. This section
begins with the following general guidance:
A claim that requires one or more acts to be performed defines a
process. However, not all processes are statutory under § 101. To
be statutory, a claimed computer-related process must either: (1)
Result in a physical transformation outside the computer for which
a practical application in the technological arts is either disclosed in
the specification or would have been known to a skilled artisan...
213 Id. at 7481.
214 Id.
211 Id. at 7482.
216 id
217 id
218 i.
219 Id
22 Id at 7482-83.
22' Id. at 7483.
2Id
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or (2) be limited by the language in the claim to a practical
application within the technological arts .... The claimed practical
application must be a further limitation upon the claimed subject
matter if the process is confined to the internal operations of the
computer. If a physical transformation occurs outside the
computer, it is not necessary to claim the practical application. A
disclosure that permits a skilled artisan to practice the claimed
invention, i.e., to put it to a practical use, is sufficient. On the other
hand, it is necessary to claim the practical application if there is no
physical transformation or if the process merely manipulates
concepts or converts one set of numbers into another.224
This section of the Guidelines then goes on to describe two types of "safe
harbors" which ensure that a claimed process that results in a physical
transformation outside the computer is statutory."5 The first type of safe harbor
requires the recitation of "physical acts to be performed outside the computer
independent of and following the steps to be performed by a programmed
computer, where those acts involve the manipulative of tangible physical objects
and result in the object having a different physical attribute or structure., 226 The
second type of safe harbor
requires the measurements of physical objects or activities to be
transformed outside of the computer into computer data, where the
data comprises signals corresponding to physical objects or
activities external to the computer system, and where the process
causes a physical transformation of the signals which are intangible
representations of the physical objects or activities.2 7
In addition to these safe harbors, computer-related processes that are limited
to a practical application in the technological arts are statutory."8 One example
provided by the Guidelines of this type of claim is "a computerized method of
optimally controlling transfer, storage and retrieval of data between cache and
hard disk storage devices such that the most frequently used data is readily
available. 
229
224 Id.
22' Id. at 7483-84.
226 Id. at 7483.
227 Id at 7484 (footnotes omitted).
228 Id.
229 Id
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The Guidelines also state that "if the 'acts' of a claimed process manipulate
only numbers, abstract concepts or ideas, or signals representing any of the
foregoing, the acts are not being applied to appropriate subject matter., 230 For
example, "claims define a non-statutory process if they: [1] consist solely of
mathematical operations without some claimed practical application (i.e.,
executing a 'mathematical algorithm'), or [2] simply manipulate abstract ideas, e.g.,
a bid or a bubble hierarchy, without some claimed practical application."" The
Guidelines also provide guidance as to when claim language related to
mathematical operation steps of a process may properly limit a claim.232 Finally,
the Guidelines state that "a process that consists solely of the manipulation of an
abstract idea without any limitation to a practical application is non-statutory.
233
Although somewhat convoluted and arguably out-of-touch with U.S. case law,
the Guidelines, in practice, do not rule out a physical requirement for software-
related inventions. In fact, the Guidelines' emphasis on practical applications,
tangible physical objects, and physical transformations may be viewed as
buttressing a physicality requirement. However, one should also recognize that
the Guidelines do not embrace such a physicality requirement explicitly, and even
give some indication that other factors will be considered.2" For example, the
Guidelines state that "[a] claimed process that consists solely of mathematical
operations is non-statutory whether or not it is performed on a computer."23'
This statement seems to contravene Comisk9y's rule that an algorithm may be
statutory subject matter if the algorithm somehow involves another class of
statutory subject matter (i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition).
However, one runs the risk of losing sight of the forest for the trees by
analyzing the Guidelines too extensively. The Guidelines, as discussed above, are
not binding law, and have not been amended since the publication of Comiskey
and Nui/ten. Furthermore, as many a patent practitioner has observed, the
USPTO is often satisfied with respect to the patentability of a computer program
product if the claimed computer program product recites a tangible medium, such
as a recordable-type medium. The effect of Comiskey and Nuiten on actual
practice before the USPTO remains to be seen.
2 Id
231 Id.
232 See id at 7486 (stating that claim language that simply specifies an intended use or field of use
for the invention generally will not limit the scope of the claim).
233 id.
2 Id.
23' Id at 7484.
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C. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PATENTABILITY UNDER THE EUROPEAN PATENT
CONVENTION AND UNITED STATES LAW
Recent cases adjudicated by the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent
Office rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the explicit or implicit presence of a
physical feature relating to computers in the claimed invention to reach a
determination of patentability under Article 52.236 On the other side of the
Atlantic Ocean, U.S. courts have struggled for years to come up with a solution
for how to treat software-related inventions. Early on, U.S. courts focused on the
presence of a "mathematical algorithm," but this approach became generally
disfavored over time. Interestingly, recent case law from U.S. courts has gradually
moved toward a physicality requirement that focuses on the presence of a
machine, manufacture, or composition in the claimed invention. 237  This
conclusion is consummated in Comisky, in which the Federal Circuit stated that
"[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only two instances in which
such a method may qualify as a section 101 process: when the
process 'either [1] was tied to a particular apparatus' or [2] operated
to change materials to a 'different state or thing.' "... Thus, a
claim that involves both a mental process and one of the other
categories of statutory subject matter (i.e., a machine, manufacture,
or composition) may be patentable under § 101.2"8
Regarding claims other than methods, the Federal Circuit in Nuiten defined the
categories of machine, article of manufacture, and composition of matter as
requiring physical, and not merely transitory, features.239 Thus, although Niten
did express disfavor toward transient physical features, Nuiten further supports
the general move toward requiring a physical feature similar to that required by
the EPO, especially since the EPO, in all of the cases discussed in this Article,
identified physical hardware features that were not transient. Thus, in light of
recent case law, one may observe a general convergence on a physicality
requirement on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
Despite this simple point of convergence, one should nonetheless be aware
of differences that continue to exist between the two jurisdictions' approaches.
For example, the Board will imply physical hardware features from the
surrounding text in the claimed invention. No corresponding trend may be
gleaned in the United States. Also, the strong emphasis on the "involvement" of
236 See supra Part I.A.
23' See supra Part I.B. 1.
2 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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physical features, as consummated in Comiskqy, is by no means settled in the
United States. Caution towards a wholehearted adoption of a physicality
requirement is exemplified by the statement in Comiskgy that "the mere use of the
machine to collect data necessary for application of the mental process may not
make the claim patentable subject matter."2' This statement opens to the door
to a possible examination of bow the physical feature is claimed, which is more
involved than simply requiring a mere presence or involvement. Nuiten's disfavor
of "transient" physical features also gives us reason to be cautious in concluding
the existence of a physicality requirement in U.S. law.
Another lesson that may be gleaned from the evolution of U.S. case law is the
general undesirability of convoluted approaches to determining patentability. The
Federal Circuit's frustration with these convoluted approaches, such as the
approach centering on the "mathematical algorithm," is evident in the discussion
above.241 Such approaches involve esoteric discourse on metaphysical ideas that
border on the philosophical and are adverse to providing certainty to practitioners
who increasingly deal with software-related inventions. A physicality requirement,
however, which focuses on the presence of a physical hardware feature, is an easy-
to-understand rule that gives practitioners a high degree of certainty. Case law in
Europe and the United States will continue to evolve, and new innovations may
make such a physicality requirement obsolete. However, courts on each continent
should be cognizant of the importance of certainty and avoid the web-like
approaches that plagued early U.S. case law on the patentability of software-
related inventions.
240 Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1380.
241 See supra Part I.B.1.
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